Unified Description for Network Information Hiding Methods by Wendzel, Steffen et al.
This paper is a pre-print of the following publication:
S. Wendzel, W. Mazurczyk, S. Zander: Unified Description for Net-
work Information Hiding Methods, Journal of Universal Computer Science
(J.UCS), Vol. 22(11), 2016.
Please note that the full-text of the final publication can be downloaded under
the following URL (open access):
http://www.jucs.org/jucs_22_11/unified_description_for_network
1
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
07
43
8v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  9
 Ja
n 2
01
7
Unified Description for Network Information
Hiding Methods
Steffen WENDZEL1, Wojciech MAZURCZYK2,3, Sebastian ZANDER4
January 10, 2017
1 Fraunhofer FKIE, Bonn, Germany
2 Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
3 FernUniversita¨t in Hagen, Hagen, Germany
4 Murdoch University, Perth, Australia
Abstract
Until now hiding methods in network steganography have been de-
scribed in arbitrary ways, making them difficult to compare. For instance,
some publications describe classical channel characteristics, such as ro-
bustness and bandwidth, while others describe the embedding of hidden
information. We introduce the first unified description of hiding methods
in network steganography. Our description method is based on a com-
prehensive analysis of the existing publications in the domain. When our
description method is applied by the research community, future publica-
tions will be easier to categorize, compare and extend. Our method can
also serve as a basis to evaluate the novelty of hiding methods proposed
in the future.
Keywords: Information Hiding, Steganography, Covert Channels, Scientific
Methodology, Patterns
1 Introduction
Steganography research determines, describes and evaluates methods that hide
information within a medium; steganalysis research develops, describes and eval-
uates methods for the detection and prevention of such methods [1, 2]. Steganog-
raphy has been applied in ancient Greece, in several wars, including World War
I and II, and to digital media (digital images, audio files, and digital videos)
[1, 3]. Network steganography or network information hiding, the most recent
sub-discipline of steganography, deals with the hiding of information in network
traffic [4].
Well over 100 methods for hiding in network transmissions were published
since Girling introduced the first methods in 1987 [5]. Wendzel et al. clustered
these hiding methods in so-called hiding patterns and organized these patterns
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in form of a taxonomy [6]. Hiding patterns are abstract descriptions of hiding
methods in a pre-defined format. Using eleven patterns, 109 hiding methods
could be described showing how redundant similar ideas were in past research.
The introduction of patterns moreover allows to handle hiding methods under
a unified term (the pattern) instead of several separate terms introduced by
previous research. Mazurczyk et al. refined parts of Wendzel’s et al. work in
[4].
On the basis of hiding patterns, a new academic workflow was defined by
Wendzel and Palmer for the creativity evaluation of network information hiding
methods [7]. The key concept of this workflow is that if a new hiding method
cannot be represented by an existing pattern, it comprises higher novelty. The
evaluation process of hiding methods in conjunction with hiding patterns is
integrated into the traditional peer-review process but requires an author to
explain why a hiding method is (or is not) represented by an existing hiding
pattern. The approach of [7] fosters the reduction of terminology inconsistencies
as new publications will be aligned to existing pattern terminology and the
improved peer review process eases spotting any inconsistencies.
The aforementioned publications emphasize on the categorization of hiding
methods, the reduction of inconsistent terminology and redundant ideas, and
the evaluation of the novelty of hiding methods.
Hiding
Patterns
(Wendzel et al., 2015)
and (Mazurczyk et al.,
2016)
Unified
Description
for Hiding
Methods
(this publication)
Provides a unified taxonomy
of hiding methods based on
patterns and shows redundancies
in the research domain.
Creativity
Framework
(Wendzel and Palmer,
2015)
Provides a framework to
evaluate the novelty of hiding
methods in academic peer
reviews.
are the
basis for
Enables the comparison of
hiding methods which were
previously described in a non-
unified (non-comparable) way.
enriches
Figure 1: Contribution of this work: While hiding patterns serve as a basis for
this new publication, it provides its own contribution by enabling the structured
comparison of research work on hiding methods and it can be also used in
conjunction with the creativity framework.
After analyzing 131 hiding method descriptions from 74 publications pub-
lished between 1987 and 2015, we found relevant inconsistencies in the descrip-
tion of hiding methods. In particular, we noticed large differences in the evalua-
tions and technical descriptions between the publications. While for some hiding
methods, the channel capacity is described, other publications focus solely on
the embedding process, the application scenario or other aspects. Moreover,
the descriptions of hiding methods even vary within some of the papers. We
also found that some papers combine the evaluation and description for several
hiding methods. For example, some publications discuss the overall throughput
of multiple hiding methods instead of discussing the different channels sepa-
rately. These non-unified descriptions make it difficult to compare publications
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that propose new hiding methods and to evaluate each described hiding method
separately.
Contribution. In this paper, we introduce a method for a unified descrip-
tion of hiding methods in network steganography. Figure 1 visualizes our contri-
bution in the context of previous work. The existing hiding patterns describe in
a generic way how hidden information is signaled, and the creativity framework
provides a way to reduce redundant research outcomes and to evaluate whether
a proposed hiding method is actually new, or not.
This paper fills a missing gap in the previous work by introducing a multi-
facetted and detail-rich description for hiding methods. When applied by the
scientific community, our unified description method will enable the easy com-
parison, categorization, and evaluation of the hiding patterns. Our description
method can also serve as a basis for the creativity framework and will enrich
the evaluation process of the same.
Outline. Section 2 introduces fundamentals and related work. Section 3
provides an overview of the unified description method for hiding methods.
The description method is split into three main categories, which are covered in
sections 4–6. We provide two exemplary descriptions in section 7. We discuss
results of our literature analysis in section 8. Section 9 explains how the unified
description can be used in combination with a creativity framework to evaluate
the novelty of newly proposed hiding methods. We provide a conclusion in
section 10.
2 Fundamentals
Patterns are used in various sciences and can be seen as abstract descriptions
of recurring designs. By definition, patterns represent a design (or solution) to
a re-occurring problem in a given context. In network steganography, hiding
patterns describe how to use use a method (solution) to hide data (problem)
in network traffic (context) [6, 7]. In other words, a pattern describes a hiding
method in an abstract way. For instance, a pattern can describe that bits can
be hidden in the least significant bits (LSB) of network header fields but it
does not cover details on how this will be achieved within a particular network
protocol. Patterns can also contain a description of their relation to other
patterns, forming not only a classification for hiding methods but a taxonomy
of hiding methods [6].
Classifications and taxonomies have a long history and were already applied
in other scientific domains. In ancient Greece, Aristotle wrote his Categories
which contain a taxonomy of living things. In 1735, Linnaeus published his Sys-
tema Naturae, providing a taxonomy of the Animal, Plant and Mineral King-
doms. In the 19th century, Danish curator Thomsen introduced the three-age
system to categorize archeological artifacts into three main ages (Stone, Bronze
and Iron age) based on industrial stages [8]. Manktelow provides an overview
with additional examples of taxonomy development throughout the history of
Biology in [9].
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While taxonomy and categorization can be applied at large scale, such as
for the categorization of the Animal Kingdom, it can be also applied to smaller
areas, such as network information hiding methods. Our paper is not a re-
placement for [6] which introduced a taxonomy for hiding methods. Instead, it
significantly extends the general classification of hiding patterns in [6, 4] and
supports the workflow in [7] by introducing a description for hiding methods on
a detailed level.
3 Unified Description Method
We analyzed the literature describing 131 hiding methods published since 1987.
The analysis revealed that the descriptions of hiding methods in the related pub-
lications differ significantly regarding their provided information. To improve
this situation, we designed a unified description method.
3.1 Applicability to Scientific Work
The unified description method can be directly applied to structure new scien-
tific papers. This way, authors which present hiding methods make it easy for
other researchers and reviewers to compare the new hiding method with existing
hiding methods. Our unified description can be also combined with the ‘cre-
ativity framework’ [7] to evaluate the novelty of a proposed hiding method by
applying concepts of creativity research during the academic peer review pro-
cess. By combining the creativity metric with our unified description method,
both, the presentation of a hiding method and the underlying research novelty
can be compared in a process that is unified, reasonable and re-constructable.
3.2 Overview of the Description Method
Our description of hiding methods is split into three categories, namely gen-
eral information about the hiding method, description of the hiding process, and
potential or tested countermeasures. The first two categories comprise sub-
categories and each (sub-)category can be a mandatory or optional. Figure 2
provides an overview.
The category ‘hiding method general information’ consists of a link to an
existing hiding pattern and a detailed description of the hiding method. It also
includes a discussion of the application scenario and requirements of the carrier.
The category ‘hiding method process’ is split into four parts: the sender-side
and the receiver-side description of the hiding method, the details of the covert
communication channel, and the description of an associated covert channel
control protocol (if applicable). The third category discusses both potential
and evaluated countermeasure, including those that detect, limit or prevent the
particular hiding method’s use. The following three sections will explain all
categories.
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- Hiding Pattern [mandatory]
- Application Scenario [optional]
- Required Properties of the Carrier [mandatory]
- Sender-side Process [mandatory]
- Receiver-side Process [mandatory]
- Covert Channel Properties [mandatory]
- Covert Channel Control Protocol [optional]
Unified Description Method
Hiding Method General Information [mandatory]
Hiding Method Process [mandatory]
Potential or Tested Countermeasures [mandatory]
Figure 2: Overview of the description method’s structure.
4 Hiding Method General Information
This section describes the general attributes of the steganographic method.
These attributes include the hiding pattern that the method belongs to, the
considered and potential application scenarios, and general requirements for
the carrier.
4.1 Hiding Pattern [mandatory]
In [7], we proposed that when a new hiding method is to be published, it should
be assigned to a particular pattern or provide evidence why it does not match
any of the existing patterns. In case the proposed hiding method does not match
any existing pattern, a new pattern can be created. As the existing patterns
are based on many hiding methods invented since 1987, it is likely that a new
hiding method can be represented by an existing pattern. In the less likely case
that no existing pattern fits, the authors of the new method must provide a
detailed explanation of a new pattern that underpins the novelty of the hiding
method they propose. The consequence of a new pattern is an extension of the
existing pattern catalog.
If the authors decide a hiding method can be represented by an existing
pattern, the pattern should be stated including the whole hierarchical path
of the pattern in the pattern hierarchy (including sub-patterns). The hiding
pattern hierarchy is described in detail in [6] and an on-line version is available
under https://ih-patterns.blogspot.com.
A pattern name including the path within the hierarchy is the complete
path from the root node of the hierarchy to the leaf that represents the pattern.
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For instance, a hiding method that modifies the least significant bit (LSB) of a
header element would be represented by the “LSB” pattern and the full path of
the hierarchy would be:
Network Covert Storage Channels
‘-- Modification of Non-Payload
‘-- Structure Preserving
‘-- Modification of an Attribute
‘-- Value Modulation
‘-- Least Significant Bit (LSB)
For each element of the hierarchy, it should be explained briefly why the
described hiding method belongs to the element, e.g. why the new method is
a covert storage channel (and not a timing channel), why it preserves instead
of modifies the structure of a PDU, why it is an attribute modification, value
modulation, and LSB-based method. Using the hierarchy-based explanation,
every reader who has knowledge of the pattern hierarchy can easily follow and
verify the argumentation of an author.
4.2 Application Scenario(s) [optional]
This category describes the application scenario for which a hiding method was
developed. It helps to identify novel application scenarios and makes it easier
to compare different methods as some hiding methods may have application-
specific limitations. Such methods may not be usable in other scenarios. For
example, hiding methods developed for breaking anonymization [10] may pro-
vide only small throughput making them unusable for general-purpose commu-
nication.
Many hiding methods were developed for general-purpose communication,
i.e. the passing of secret messages between two or more parties. Typically this
application is motivated by the existence of an adversarial relationship between
different groups, such as government agencies versus criminal or terrorist orga-
nizations or dissenting citizens versus their governments. Other existing hiding
methods are tailored to the case of hackers or corporate spies whose aim is to
covertly control compromised systems or ex-filtrate data from compromised sys-
tems. Similarly, malware, such as computer viruses or worms, can use hiding
methods to spread undetected, to ex-filtrate data, or for covertly exchanging
information (e.g. execute brute-force attacks on cryptosystems [11]). Indeed,
this rising trend has been recently confirmed by many real-life examples of in-
formation hiding-capable malware [12].
On the other hand, there are hiding methods that were developed for very
specific contexts. Some hiding methods were developed for breaking anonymiza-
tion, for example Murdoch et al. developed methods to reveal servers hidden
inside anonymization networks [13, 10]. Other hiding methods were developed
for transmitting authentication data, for example to allow authorized users to
access open firewall ports while presenting these ports as closed to all other
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users (“port knocking”) [14]. Another type of hiding methods were designed for
packet/flow traceback or watermarking – techniques used for linking different
observable instances of network packets or flows in scenarios where packet con-
tents cannot be used for linking [15]. Another specific application are hiding
methods developed for cheating in on-line games [16].
In case a hiding method is for general-purpose communication, no compre-
hensive description is needed. However, for methods that were developed for
a specific application in a specific context, the application scenario should be
described in detail. Also, new application scenarios should be described in more
detail than well-known scenarios.
4.3 Required Properties of the Carrier [mandatory]
This category is used to specify the properties of the carrier that the hiding
method requires. It should describe whether the hiding method is limited to a
certain protocol (or a service) as carrier or whether it can be used with several
or even many different carrier protocols/services.
If the hiding method is tied to a single carrier protocol, the description must
specify the protocol and describe the specific protocol features that are used by
the hiding method. If a hiding method works with a set of carrier protocols,
the description must specify the protocols and the protocol features the hiding
method relies on. If a hiding method depends on certain protocol features that
are common to a large number of protocols, the description must list the features
and describe them. For truly generic hiding methods that work with all kinds
of carrier traffic the description may be short; however, in our experience such
generic hiding methods are rare.
For hiding methods that are not only tied to certain protocols or protocol
features, but also require certain operational conditions, these conditions must
also be described. For example, a method that hides information by inten-
tionally introducing packet losses assumes that packets of the carrier can be
discarded and also it can only blend in with the normal traffic if there is natural
packet loss [17]; hence, the possibility and occurrence of natural packet loss is
an operational condition for this hiding method.
5 Hiding Method Process
This section covers the categories which describe the actual process of the hiding
method, including the embedding and the extraction of hidden data, as well as
the channel properties and a potentially present control protocol.
5.1 Sender-side Process [mandatory]
This category describes the embedding process performed by the covert sender
to hide secret data. It must be explained whether the sender is a centralized
host/process or distributed. In the classical scenario, one sender transfers secret
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data to one receiver (the sender-to-receiver relationship is ‘1:1’). However, other
scenarios are also possible and they depend on the specific context in which a
covert transmission is performed or it can be a characteristic feature of the
carrier utilized for hidden data exchange. In case of covert channel overlay
networks, it is imaginable that one sender broadcasts the covert data to multiple
receivers (‘1:m’). In case of a distributed sending system, there may be n hosts
forming one logical sender that transfers data to one or multiple receivers (‘n:1’
and ‘n:m’ relations). For instance, if the source address of a receiver indicates a
hidden bit, two senders can be used to transfer a message of zero and one bits
to a receiver.
The location of the covert data can be also centralized or distributed de-
pending on whether the hidden data is ‘inserted’ into a single carrier (or a
subcarrier) or it is distributed across several carriers (subcarriers). This means
that the covert data can be embedded, e.g. into one particular part of a packet
or into multiple areas of a packet, but it can be also distributed among different
flows [4].
It must be also specified whether the steganographic method generates its
own cover traffic or whether data is hidden in third-party cover traffic. In
case the hiding method is responsible for the cover traffic generation then a
description of this process must be included here.
5.2 Receiver-side Process [mandatory]
This category describes the recognition and extraction process of the covert
data at the receiver-side. Similar to the sender-side process description, the
secret receiver can be also centralized or distributed and the same considerations
apply here (see section 5.1). If the receiver is a distributed system, it should
be explained how the covert data is extracted from the hidden data carrier and
how it is finally merged.
5.3 Covert Channel Properties [mandatory]
In this category the considered hidden communication scenario(s) for the par-
ticular steganographic method should be described and it should be indicated
whether the created covert channel is direct or indirect. Moreover, four charac-
teristic features of the information hiding technique should be analyzed. This
will allow to describe properties of the created covert channel. All above men-
tioned attributes are explained below.
For network steganography, two main possible communication scenarios may
be considered, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The first scenario, i.e. end-to-end sce-
nario, is the most common: the secret sender and the secret receiver perform
overt communication while simultaneously exchanging covert data. In this case
the overt communication path is equal to the covert path. In the second scenario,
i.e. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) scenario, only a part of the end-to-end overt com-
munication path is used for the hidden communication, as a result of actions
undertaken by intermediate covert nodes. Therefore, the overt sender and overt
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receiver are, in principle, unaware of the steganographic data exchange. Obvi-
ously hybrid scenarios are also possible where the overt sender/receiver serves as
secret sender/receiver but the other covert party is located in some intermediate
node.
OS OR SS SR 
I 
OS / 
SS 
OR / 
SR 
I 
Covert communication path 
Covert / overt communication path 
Overt communication path 
MitM scenario 
End-to-end scenario 
Indirect covert 
channel 
Figure 3: Hidden communication scenarios (OS – overt sender, OR – overt
receiver, SS – secret sender, SR – secret receiver, I - intermediate node)
Next, it should be indicated whether the covert channel is direct or indirect,
i.e. whether the overt traffic flows directly from the secret sender to the secret
receiver or via one or multiple intermediaries. In case of a direct channel the
overt traffic that contains the covert data flows directly from the secret sender
to the secret receiver (who both can act as middlemen). A covert channel
is indirect when the secret sender does not send covert data directly to the
secret receiver (or a destination downstream of the secret receiver). Instead,
the secret sender transmits the covert data to an intermediate host which then
unknowingly forwards (due to the functions of the overt traffic protocol) the
covert data to the secret receiver. This means that there are two flows of
the overt traffic conveying the covert data, i.e. the first flow is between the
secret sender and an unwitting intermediary and the second flow is between
the intermediary and the secret receiver. Indirect covert channels provide an
increased stealthiness as a warden does not observe a direct flow of information
between the covert sender and receiver. On the other hand they are typically
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harder to implement and have a smaller capacity than direct channels. In case of
an indirect channel the requirements on the intermediate need to be described.
For example, Rowland [18] proposed an indirect channel that exploits the
TCP three-way-handshake. Instead of sending a TCP SYN segment with an ISN
containing covert data directly, the secret sender sends the TCP SYN segment
to the intermediary (a bounce host) with a spoofed IP source address set to the
intended destination. The intermediary then sends a SYN/ACK or SYN/RST
to the secret receiver with the acknowledged sequence number equal to the
ISN+1. The secret receiver decodes the hidden information from the ACK
number (ACK−1).
The classic characteristics of any information hiding method as mentioned
by Fridrich in [3] are: steganographic bandwidth (the amount of secret data
that can be sent per unit time when using a particular method), undetectabil-
ity (defined as the inability to detect a steganogram within a certain carrier),
and robustness (defined as the amount of alteration covert data can withstand
without the secret data being destroyed). As proposed in [19] another attribute
is the steganographic cost, which describes the degradation or distortion of the
carrier caused by the application of the steganographic method. All these at-
tributes should be described, if feasible. Especially for novel methods and for
the description of third party tools, a comprehensive description of all four char-
acteristics is hardly feasible. The author of a paper may have no access to im-
plementations of these countermeasures, to testbeds in which countermeasures
could be evaluated, or may have no knowledge of all existing countermeasures.
Since the detectability issues are also discussed in the category ‘Potential and
Tested Countermeasures’ only a brief description or reference to that category
is required here.
5.4 Covert Channel Control Protocol [optional]
Several hiding methods utilize so-called covert channel control protocols. Covert
channel control protocols embed small protocol headers providing several fea-
tures including reliable data transfer (by introducing sequence numbers and
ACKs), peer discovery and dynamic overlay routing (between steganographic
peers), session management for covert transactions, adaptiveness and several
features of application layer protocols (e.g. file transfer features) [20]. If utilized
by a hiding method, both the design, implementation and features of a covert
channel control protocol must be described in this category. Otherwise, the
category can be left empty.
6 Potential or Tested Countermeasures
This category comprises no sub-categories. It should describe potential as well as
tested countermeasures available against the hiding technique. There are three
types of countermeasures that can be applied against the covert channel created
by a hiding method: elimination, limitation, and detection [21]. Not all of these
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three types may be applicable for a particular hiding method, for example some
covert channels cannot be eliminated. The description must contain a discussion
which countermeasures are applicable and which are not applicable including a
justification. Applicable countermeasures should then be described in detail.
Elimination means the covert channel created by a hiding method can be
eliminated completely. For example, a method that hides data in unused header
fields or padding bytes can be eliminated completely by a traffic normalizer that
sets the unused header fields or padding bytes to a default value (e.g. zero). Some
hiding methods cannot be eliminated, for example covert channels in on-line
game protocols [22]. If a covert channel can be eliminated, the description should
include a discussion on how the elimination works and any possible limitations.
The description should also include side-effects of the elimination process. For
example, if a covert channel in a header extension can be eliminated by removing
the header extension from the packets, then the description should include a
discussion of the impact on the protocol functionality.
Limitation means the covert channels can be perturbed, for example by
introducing noise, so that its capacity is greatly reduced and the channel ef-
fectively becomes useless. Limitation usually has side-effects on the carrier, so
there is a trade-off between reducing a covert channel’s capacity to a small value
and not significantly impacting on the carrier protocol. The description should
include a discussion on whether a channel’s capacity can be limited and the
impact on the carrier should be characterized. If a channel can be eliminated
then a description of a limitation method is optional.
Elimination or capacity-limitation are active countermeasures that require a
warden to manipulate the network traffic (active warden) [23]. However, having
an active warden may not be possible in every scenario.
Detection means the existence of the covert channel inside the carrier can
be detected, which requires a passive warden to observe the traffic. Usually
detection mechanisms are based on some characteristics that can be observed,
and the characteristics for traffic with covert channels are different from the
characteristics of regular traffic (traffic without covert channels). While detec-
tion itself is passive, it can be coupled with active measures such as targeted
blocking, elimination or limitation where the warden can manipulate suspicious
traffic with more impunity. The description should include whether the channel
can be detected and outline the detection method. If the channel is impossible
to detect, the description should provide a justification why it is undetectable.
If a detection method is introduced, the proposed characteristics for identifying
the covert channel must be defined.
If an evaluation of the proposed elimination, limitation or detection method(s)
has been conducted, the description should summarize the evaluation scenario(s)
and results. Ideally, an evaluation is done under realistic conditions, e.g., in real
networks using realistic traffic, but in practice this is not always feasible. The
description of the evaluation should point out any such limitations.
Another type of countermeasure is to change the specification of a network
protocol to prevent its use as carrier in the future. For example, a network
protocol prone to covert channels could be revised and updated with a newer
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version less prone to covert channels. In many cases this may not be realistic,
as widely deployed protocols cannot be changed easily. However, in cases where
an updated protocol could be realistically deployed, this should be described.
The description should also discuss whether the warden can be a single entity
(centralized warden) or has to be multiple distributed instances (distributed
warden), and whether the warden has to keep flow state (stateful warden) or
can operate without flow state (stateless warden).
7 Exemplary Descriptions
We now present two exemplary descriptions. The first description is for a covert
timing channel, while the second description is for a covert storage channel.
7.1 Example 1: Inter-packet Timing Method
In this example we describe a specific steganographic method for hiding infor-
mation in inter-packet timings. This method or channel is also referred to as
model-based inter-packet gap channel and was proposed by Gianvecchio et al.
[24].
7.1.1 Hiding Pattern
As the covert signaling utilizes the timing of network packets, the method
belongs to the ‘Network Covert Timing Channel’ pattern. In particular, the
method falls under ‘Inter-arrival Time’ [6]. The full path in the pattern hierar-
chy is:
Network Covert Timing Channels
‘-- Inter-arrival Time Pattern
7.1.2 Application Scenario
The method can be used for general-purpose covert communication between a
covert sender and a covert receiver or between a group of covert parties depend-
ing on whether the carrier is unicast or multicast.
7.1.3 Properties of the Carrier
The method only requires that the carrier consists of packetized data, such as
network-layer packets, whose timing can be manipulated. The method assumes
that there is sufficient noise in the timing of packets by senders and along the
path, so that manipulations of timings are not immediately suspicious. While
the method was proposed and evaluated for HTTP in [24], it is not limited only
to this protocol. However, some carrier protocols are more suitable than others.
Since the encoding destroys any dependence between the inter-packet times of
successive packets, it is best used with carriers that already have independent
inter-packet times [25].
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7.1.4 Sender-side Process
The embedding process involves fitting a model to the inter-packet time distri-
bution of regular traffic and then using the model to generate covert channels
with identical distribution (for details see [24]). There is usually a single sender
process that embeds the covert channel in a single carrier. Note that a single
carrier can be multiple traffic flows.
In the original work the covert sender generated the overt traffic [24]. How-
ever, the method can be also applied to embed the covert channel into existing
network traffic at the cost of increasing the latency of the overt traffic [25].
7.1.5 Receiver-side Process
The extracting process running on the single receiver decodes the covert bits
from the observed inter-packet times of the single carrier as described in [24].
7.1.6 Covert Channel Properties
The method can be used in the end-to-end scenario, where covert sender and
receiver are also the overt sender and receiver, and in a MitM scenario, where
covert sender and receiver are placed between the actual sender and receiver
(as well as in hybrid scenarios). The method creates a direct channel between
covert sender and receiver(s).
The steganographic bandwidth depends on the channel noise and the packet
rate of the carrier traffic. Gianvecchio et al. measured capacities of 5–20 bits
per second in their experiments. Note that in practice the goodput is likely
smaller as part of the capacity will be used by a control protocol to provide
reliable transport.
The channel is hard to detect only if the regular traffic has uncorrelated
inter-packet times which is largely the case when HTTP is used as a carrier (as
in [24]). Otherwise the channel can be detected with metrics that can measure
the dependency of inter-packet times [25].
The channel is robust against typical network packet timing noise. If an
active warden can manipulate packet timings without impunity, the capacity of
the channel would be severely reduced up to a degree where the channel would
be practically eliminated.
Measurements regarding the steganographic cost were not provided by the
authors as the concept of steganographic cost had not been introduced at that
time. The steganographic cost depends on the abovementioned channel char-
acteristics and the carrier traffic. In general, the more severely delays are per-
turbed in overt traffic, the higher the steganographic cost.
7.1.7 Control Protocol
Gianvecchio et al. [24] only describe the “physical layer” of the covert channel
(encoding/decoding of bits) and do not mention a control protocol.
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7.1.8 Countermeasures
The covert channel can be limited or even practically eliminated by introducing
timing noise, either at the sender or in the network [23]. Depending on the
carrier this may introduce unwanted side-effects though, for example, it may
add additional latency to the carrier application’s traffic.
The covert channel mimics the distribution of inter-packet times of the nor-
mal traffic. This makes the channel hard to detect if the normal traffic has
uncorrelated inter-packet times [24]. However, for applications that have cor-
related inter-packet times, the channel can be detected with metrics that can
measure the dependency of inter-packet times [25].
7.2 Example 2: DHCP Number of Options Storage Method
We now discuss the description of a covert storage channel. Rios et al. pre-
sented several DHCP-based covert channels, of which one hides information by
changing the number of DHCP options in a DHCP packet [26].
7.2.1 Hiding Pattern
As the modification of DHCP options represents the modification of a storage at-
tribute, the method falls under ‘Network Covert Storage Channels’. The DHCP
options are part of the DHCP header and thus, a ‘Modification of Non-Payload’.
They are also ‘Structure Modifying’ as the header structure is extended when
DHCP options are embedded. The signaling of the hidden information is per-
formed in a way that a sequence of objects (DHCP options) is utilized (‘Sequence
Pattern’) and, in particular, the number of options represents the hidden infor-
mation itself (‘Number of Elements Pattern’) [6]. The full path in the pattern
hierarchy is:
Network Covert Storage Channels
‘-- Modification of Non-Payload
‘-- Structure Modifying
‘-- Sequence Pattern
‘-- Number of Elements Pattern
7.2.2 Application Scenario
Rios et al. discuss a potential application in a data exfiltration scenario [26]: Al-
ice, having privileged access to an embassy network, needs to receive information
from Bob, but the direct communication between Alice and Bob is forbidden
and the Internet-based communication between them would be suspicious. Bob
visits the embassy and transfers network messages to Alice. He embeds hidden
information within the non-blocked DHCP protocol using the local network.
The application scenario foresees only an uni-directional communication, i.e.
no backwards channel from Alice to Bob, but in general the channel could be
bi-directional.
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7.2.3 Properties of the Carrier
The DHCP protocol must be allowed, i.e. not administratively prohibited by
a network security policy (e.g. blocked by a switch or layer-2 firewall). As the
intended transfer of hidden information is uni-directional, i.e., only from Bob
to Alice, Alice is not required to be able to send over the carrier herself.
The hiding method is protocol-specific and can only be applied to the DHCP
protocol. To apply the technique, the network must not block particular DHCP
options and the encoding of hidden information must be performed in a way
that for all encodable symbols, the resulting DHCP packet is still transferable
over the carrier.
7.2.4 Sender-side Process
The secret sender generates its own overt traffic. The sender-side process embeds
a hidden symbol by adding the number of DHCP options the symbol requires
for its encoding to the DHCP packet. At least two options must be embedded
due to the DHCP standard, for example, if the symbols are ‘A’–‘Z’, the symbol
‘A’ requires two options already [26]. The symbol ‘Z’ would require 27 options,
which is likely to raise suspicion [26] and may be blocked by firewalls. Each
symbol to be transmitted must be encoded in a separate packet.
Reliability is not implemented directly – instead the recovery mechanisms
provided by DHCP against packet loss are exploited [26].
7.2.5 Receiver-side Process
The receiver observes DHCP messages sent by the covert sender and counts the
number of embedded DHCP options. The number of DHCP options represents
the hidden symbol. The decoding is performed separately for each DHCP packet
and the received symbols are combined to reassemble the transmitted message.
7.2.6 Covert Channel Properties
The method works in an end-to-end communication scenario. It cannot be used
in a MitM scenario due to the properties of DHCP (broadcast messages that
are limited to one subnet). The channel is a direct channel.
The bandwidth of the channel depends on the number of DHCP packets sent
per second. In general, the channel can transfer as many symbols as packets
per second.
The detectability of the channel increases with the number of symbols en-
coded per second and with the size of the encoded symbol. The detectability
of a message transfer could be improved by encoding the most frequently used
symbols with shorter messages (i.e. apply a Huffman coding).
Robustness of the covert communication is provided by the use of DHCP’s
recovery mechanisms.
Measurements regarding the steganographic cost were not provided by the
authors as the concept of steganographic cost had not been introduced at that
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time. In general, the distortion of the used carrier (e.g. the Ethernet environ-
ment) is minimal as long as the number of DHCP packets does not influence
the network’s performance in a recognizable manner.
7.2.7 Control Protocol
No control protocol was described in [26]. Several existing control protocols
for covert storage channels are surveyed in [20] but are generally designed for a
bi-directional communication. As stated in [26], a bi-directional communication
over the covert channel is feasible, so bi-directional control protocols could be
integrated.
7.2.8 Countermeasures
The easiest way to eliminate the method is to prevent the use of the DHCP
protocol or DHCP packets with more than two options. However, this solu-
tion may not be practically applicable as the DHCP protocol is essential in
most networking environments. A traffic normalizer that deletes uncommon
or redundant DHCP options would be a better solution but it may eliminate
actually required protocol functionality.
Another potential countermeasure would be to limit the number of DHCP
packets per second. This approach reduces the channel’s performance as each
symbol must be encoded in a separate packet. As the number of DHCP packets
per second is unlikely to be high during regular transmissions, a statistical
analysis will probably allow an accurate detection of the steganographic method.
Rios et al. state that large DHCP packets, i.e. those with many options, may
raise suspicion [26]. DHCP packets with an unusual large number of embedded
options can likely be detected with simple intrusion detection rules.
8 Literature Analysis
We analyzed 74 publications published between 1987 and 2015. Figure 4 shows
the analyzed publications per year. In early years, only few papers on network
covert channels were published. The number of papers grew over time due
to the increasing popularity of the topic. As some papers describe more than
one hiding technique, the number of analyzed hiding techniques (n=131) is
sometimes larger than the number of publications, which is also shown in Fig. 4.
Finding 1: Several papers lack fundamental attributes
As already stated in the introduction, our analysis shows that publications on
hiding methods present varying subsets of attributes. Figure 5 provides an
overview of the present attributes for all described hiding methods of the an-
alyzed papers. When an attribute’s description is classified as ‘partial’, the
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Figure 4: Analyzed publications that present hiding methods (per year).
authors provided some aspects but lack other fundamental aspects of the par-
ticular attribute. The comprehensive description of an attribute was marked
with ‘yes’ (fully present).
Figure 5: Presence (fully or partially) of selected attributes in the publications.
Out of the 131 described hiding methods, the application scenario was pro-
vided for 78% of them (74 fully, 30 partially). The required properties for the
hiding method were fully described for 74 and partially for 14 hiding methods
(combined 67%). For some of the techniques, the authors provided countermea-
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sures: 55 contained a full description with evaluation of at least one counter-
measure and for another 13 techniques, possible countermeasures were at least
briefly discussed (combined 58%).
The channel capacity was evaluated for 52% of the hiding methods (56 fully,
13 partially; both values also including throughput and bitrate measurements).
The robustness of the proposed hiding methods was discussed for only 22% of
the hiding methods (19 fully, 10 partially). Control protocols are not part of
most hiding methods and for this reason only described for 5% of the hiding
methods (4 fully, 3 partially).
Finding 2: Attribute coverage changed over time
The attributes covered by publications changed over time. Figure 6 provides
an overview of selected attributes over time. We omitted the sender-side and
receiver-side processes that were described in most publications but in very
varying detail.
Figure 6: Coverage of selected attributes for hiding methods over time.
Over time, the covert channel capacity was increasingly discussed, especially
in publications from the last six years (2010–2015). Channel robustness was
constantly discussed for only 20% of the hiding methods. Both, channel capacity
and robustness are part of the ‘Covert Channel Properties’ in our description
method. The discussion of countermeasures varied over time and is similar
in the range 2010–2015 as it was in 1987–1999 (approx. 68%). The required
properties of the carrier were discussed by fewer publications in recent years
(2010–2015) compared to the years 2000–2009.
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As hiding patterns were proposed only recently, none of the existing publi-
cations covered hiding patterns. We analyzed all hiding methods by verifying
whether they were already assigned a pattern in [6] and for several methods
which had not been analyzed in [6], we determined their hiding patterns. We
were able to assign 130 of the 131 analyzed hiding methods to their respective
patterns. One publication discussed a steganographic key exchange that ap-
plies to many hiding methods and thus cannot be assigned to a hiding pattern.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of hiding patterns.
Figure 7: Occurrences of hiding patterns for the analyzed hiding methods.
Finding 3: Inconsistent descriptions of methods within the
same paper
Some of the publications describe several hiding methods while applying an
inconsistent description for these. We use [27] as an example for this scenario.
The authors present two covert channels for pervasive computing environments.
The first signals hidden information by modulating the Link Quality Indication
(LQI) of 802.15.4 wireless networks while the second modulates the values of
a temperature sensor to signal hidden information. Table 1 indicates which
of the selected attributes of the description are present, partially present, or
not present. The table reveals that different attributes are described for each
channel. The lack of a unified description makes it harder to compare different
channels.
Finding 4: Several papers combined the evaluation of mul-
tiple hiding methods
We also found that sometimes multiple hiding methods are treated in a com-
bined way throughout a paper. Tab. 1 summarizes the combined and the non-
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Table 1: Inconsistent descriptions and combined discussions of attributes within
papers: present attributes of the hiding methods described in [27] and [28]
Hiding Method Application
Scenario
Required
Proper-
ties
Counter-
measures
Sender-
Receiver
Relation
Direct/
Indirect
Robustness Capacity
Link quality [27]  ,combined G#  # #   
Sensor data [27] G# G#  G#  G#
SDP o-tag [28]  ,combined G#,combined # # # G#,combined G#,combined
SDP a-tag [28] # # #
combined attributes of [28]. The authors describe two hiding methods for SIP
useful for the stealthy command-and-control communication in a botnet. The
first channel uses the mandatory ‘¡o¿’ tag to carry hidden information while the
second uses the optional ‘¡a¿’ tag and its parameter to do the same. Both chan-
nels are combined for the evaluation process as both channels are necessary to
transfer the required secret message. This combined evaluation does not allow
the reader to understand the performance of each channel separately and it also
makes the comparison against other methods difficult.
9 Linking the Description Method and the Cre-
ativity Framework
In the creativity framework [7], the major focus is on the evaluation of creativity,
especially originality, of a proposed hiding method. We will briefly describe the
creativity framework and afterwards explain how the new unified description
method can be used to improve it.
Steps of the Creativity Framework: The creativity framework consists of
five steps which are aligned with the traditional peer review process. In step
one, a pattern database is generated by the research community. Due to the
availability of a pattern catalog [6, 4], step one is already accomplished.
In the second step, the authors create the idea of a new hiding method, e.g.
to embedd hidden bits into a new network protocol. The authors describe their
new hiding method in form of a scientific paper in step three. They justify
the novelty of their method using the creativity metric [7], which is based on
the originality of the method (hiding method pattern) as well as the context
(application scenario and carrier network protocol).
The authors submit their paper to a peer review. The reviewers evaluate
the novelty of the work using the creativity metric and decide whether the
proposed work is a “Big-C” or a “small-c” contribution, i.e. whether the work
consists a high level of creativity. Big-C and small-c are standard terms from
creativity research. Only in the Big-C case, the work is accepted to represent
a new pattern and its pattern description is optimized in step four, otherwise
step four is skipped.
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The work is published in step five. In case of “Big-C” the publication has
to state that the work represents a new pattern – this automatically extends
the pattern database. In case of “small-c”, the hiding method is published but
the authors cannot claim that they have discovered a new pattern; instead they
provide new results for an existing hiding pattern.
Benefits of Combining Both Approaches: The creativity metric does not
enforce a detailed description structure. Our new unified description method can
replace the creativity metric, since it provides a more fine-grained description
and allows for the distinction and comparison of various aspects of a hiding
method. Several attributes, such as whether a hiding method can operate in a
MitM setup or a distinction between the sender-side and receiver-side processes,
were not covered in [7]. On the other hand, our unified description method can
benefit from the creativity framework. There is no reason to create a new
approach for integrating the unified description method into the peer review
process. Also, the creativity framework evaluates the novelty of a hiding method
by applying research from creativity psychology, which can serve as an add-on
to the technical evaluation of the unified description method. In summary, the
combination of both approaches has many benefits.
10 Discussion and Conclusion
We developed an approach to unify and structure the description of network
steganographic methods. To this end, we performed a comprehensive literature
analysis in the domain to identify requirements for the description method. Cur-
rently, no such description exists, making it difficult to compare the published
work on hiding methods. Unified descriptions of hiding methods are desirable
as they ease the comparison of research results. They also improve the acces-
sibility of hiding methods and foster the reproduction of experimental results.
As a key aspect of our description method is the association of hiding methods
with a hiding pattern, the approach automatically enforces a categorization of
the research results.
However, unified descriptions for hiding methods are hard to enforce as,
in the end, it is up to every author to decide how to describe his or her hiding
method. For this reason, we designed our description so that it will be applicable
and attractive for many authors. Our description structure does not specify
every single detail of all attributes. It leaves several decisions to the authors,
such as whether or not to discuss details of certain attributes (e.g. covert channel
capacity), the form of descriptions (e.g. text or figures), and the extent of the
descriptions. This flexibility allows to apply the unified description method also
in short papers which are, for many conferences, limited to four to six pages.
As some attributes are specified as ‘optional’, they can be also left out.
We propose combining the new unified description method with the existing
‘creativity framework’. The framework’s process is kept but the ‘creativity
metric’ of the framework is replaced with our unified description method.
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